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ABSTRACT 
 
Objectives: To test the liberation hypothesis in a judicial context unconstrained by 
sentencing guidelines.  
 
Methods: We examined cross-sectional sentencing data (n = 17,671) using a hurdle count 
model, which combines a binary (logistic regression) model to predict zero counts and a 
zero-truncated negative binomial model to predict positive counts. We also conducted a 
series of Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate that the hurdle count model provides 
unbiased estimates of our sentencing data and outperforms alternative approaches. 
 
Results: For the liberation hypothesis, results of the interaction terms for race x offense 
severity and race x criminal history varied by decision type. For the in/out decision, 
criminal history moderated the effects of race: among offenders with less extensive 
criminal histories blacks were more likely to be incarcerated; among offenders with 
higher criminal histories this race effect disappeared. The race x offense severity 
interaction was not significant for the in/out decision. For the sentence length decision, 
offense severity moderated the effects of race: among offenders convicted of less serious 
crimes blacks received longer sentences than whites; among offenders convicted of 
crimes falling in the most serious offense categories the race effect became non-
significant for Felony D offenses and transitioned to a relative reduction for blacks for the 
most serious Felony A, B, and C categories. The race x criminal history interaction was 
not significant for the length decision.   
 
Conclusions: There is some support for the liberation hypothesis in this test from a non-
guidelines jurisdiction. The findings suggest, however, that the decision to incarcerate 
and the sentence length decision may employ different processes in which the 
interactions between race and seriousness measures vary.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent assessments of the criminal sentencing literature have noted two important goals: 
(1) identifying the extent to which racial disparities are present in the judicial process, and (2) 
examining the effects of various policy initiatives on sentencing outcomes (Baumer, 2013; 
Ulmer, 2012). While much progress has been made toward these objectives, scholars such as 
Baumer (2013) and Ulmer (2012) continue to highlight the need for studies that examine not just 
whether race matters in sentencing, but also how and when race factors into judicial decision-
making (see also Spohn, 2000). These calls are reinforced by a growing literature that finds 
racial disparities in certain parts of the criminal justice process but not others (e.g., Blumstein, 
1982, Kutateladze et al., 2014; Rehavi and Starr, 2014). Moreover, there has been a particular 
emphasis on the need to examine sentencing practices in a broader variety of contexts—in places 
other than guidelines jurisdictions like Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Washington, and the federal 
system, which have dominated the literature (Engen, 2009; Reitz, 2009; Ulmer, 2012).  
The current study investigates the extent to which the severity of the offense and the prior 
record of the offender condition the likelihood that black offenders receive more punitive 
treatment in a jurisdiction unconstrained by sentencing guidelines. Applied to criminal 
sentencing, the “liberation hypothesis” posits that judicial decision-makers will feel constrained 
to sentence offenders in an equally harsh manner in the most serious cases (Kalven and Zeisel, 
1966; Spohn and Cederblom, 1991). In such instances, extralegal characteristics like race of the 
offender will not be considered given the overshadowing importance of factors like offense 
severity and prior record. However, for defendants with less severe cases and less extensive 
criminal histories, greater ambiguity surrounds the sentencing decision; thus, judges will feel 
“liberated” to individualize the sentence on a variety of factors. This ambiguity increases the 
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likelihood that sentencing decisions might be influenced by the race of the offender (Spohn, 
2000; Spohn and Cederblom, 1991; Spohn and DeLone, 2000).  
 We offer several contributions to the study of criminal sentencing by examining potential 
conditioning effects of offense seriousness and criminal history on race. We provide a robust test 
of the liberation hypothesis using data from 17,671 criminal offenders in the state of South 
Carolina. This state is particularly interesting for these purposes because there are no sentencing 
guidelines, which means that decision-makers have greater discretion when sentencing offenders. 
Methodologically, we employ a class of event count models, which better handle positively 
skewed distributions such as those found in sentencing data thereby allowing the researcher to fit 
a model to the data rather than manipulating the data to fit a model. In sum, testing the 
interaction of certain offender characteristics with offense severity and prior record may provide 
insight into when disparities manifest in sentencing decisions.  
 
2. PRIOR LITERATURE 
 The primary “meta-goal” of sentencing research has been to explore racial disparities in 
sentencing outcomes (Baumer, 2013; see also Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 2000). In explaining racial 
disparities in sentencing, social science researchers have generally relied on theoretical 
explanations rooted in symbolic interactionism, a sociological theory which holds that an actor’s 
words and actions toward another entity are based on meanings the actor ascribes to the other 
person, event, situation, or thing (Blumer, 1969; Ulmer, 1997; Wooldredge, 2007). In the court 
context, symbolic interactionism suggests that judicial decision-making is a function of the 
meaning ascribed to an offender’s characteristics, actions, and past behaviors—for example, the 
meaning a judge gives to a “young person,” a “black man,” a “violent offender,” or a “repeat 
offender.” More specifically, courtroom actors develop patterned responses to certain cues such 
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as the seriousness of the offense, whether it involved violence, and the defendant’s criminal 
record, as well as extralegal characteristics like race, gender, and socioeconomic status 
(Albonetti, 1991; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998).   
For Steffensmeier and colleagues (1998) these symbolic interactions coalesce around 
three focal concerns of sentencing. Courtroom decision-makers: (1) emphasize blameworthiness 
by imposing severe penalties on offenders who commit serious offenses, who have extensive 
criminal histories, or who cause more harm; (2) seek to protect the community from dangerous 
offenders by attempting to anticipate future behavior (which calls on the decision-maker’s 
attributions about characteristics of the case and offender); and (3) attempt to navigate practical 
constraints such as the availability of jail space and the desire to maintain relationships in the 
courtroom workgroup. Drawing on the work of Albonetti (1991) and others, Steffensmeier and 
colleagues note that the decisions informed by these three focal concerns are based on limited 
information and involve uncertain predictions—for example, about who is likely to reoffend. 
Accordingly, court actors develop “perceptual shorthands” which appear to include salient 
stereotypes for young minority males. 
Several systematic reviews of the sentencing literature have concluded that race effects 
are often present in the decision to incarcerate, though much less likely to occur for the length of 
the sentencing decision (Chiricos and Crawford, 1995; Mitchell, 2005; Spohn, 2000). Chiricos 
and Crawford (1995) found more pronounced disparities in Southern jurisdictions, though region 
was not a statistically significant predictor of the relationship between race and sentencing 
outcomes for Mitchell (2005). Based on these reviews, which cover hundreds of studies, Baumer 
(2013: 242) concluded that there are “small but statistically significant direct race differences in 
 6 
the probability of imprisonment to the disadvantage of blacks,” but little evidence of “direct race 
differences in prison sentence lengths between these two groups.”  
2.1 Interaction Effects and the Liberation Hypothesis 
Increasingly, scholars have shifted attention away from direct effects to investigate 
conditional effects of race and other characteristics on sentencing decisions. Spohn (2000: 432), 
for instance, intimated “it is overly simplistic to assume that minorities will receive harsher 
sentences than whites regardless of the crime, the seriousness of the offense, or the culpability of 
the defendant.” Both Spohn (2000) and Zatz (2000) suggest a focus on ways that race might 
conditionally affect sentencing by modeling interactions (see also Spohn and DeLone, 2000). 
One line of contextualized disparity inquiry—and our focus for this paper—concerns the 
liberation hypothesis. The liberation hypothesis was originally articulated by Kalven and Zeisel 
(1966) in their landmark study of jury decision-making in which they used various case 
characteristics such as the evidence presented and demographic profile of the defendant to 
predict a jury’s likelihood of coming to a “correct” decision. The key factor that determined 
whether demographic attributes would factor into the decision was the strength of the evidence in 
the case, or as Kalven and Zeisel (1966: 165) fashioned it, whether the evidence was weak 
enough to make the case a “close” one: “The closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the 
jury to respond to sentiment by liberating it from a discipline of the evidence.” With a dearth of 
evidence a not-guilty verdict was apparent, as was a guilty verdict with an abundance of strong 
evidence. But for cases in between—the close evidence cases—extralegal factors such as juror 
views about the defendant factored into the decision-making process.  
The liberation hypothesis has since been adapted and extended to examine decision-
making in capital cases (Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, 1990), police use of force (Barkan and 
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Cohn, 1998), prosecutorial decision-making (Ball, 2006), juvenile court decision making 
(Guevara et al., 2011), application of three strikes enhancements (Chen, 2008), and parole 
violation decisions (Grattet and Lin, 2014; Lin, Grattet, and Petersilia, 2012). A number of 
studies have also applied the hypothesis to the investigation of racial disparities in traditional 
sentencing outcomes of the disposition decision (in or out of prison) and the duration decision 
(length of incarceration)
3
 (e.g., Lieber and Blowers, 2003; Spohn and Cederblom 1991; Spohn 
and DeLone, 2000; Warren, Chiricos, and Bales, 2012).  
The liberation hypothesis holds theoretical appeal and has received renewed interest in 
recent years. However, the results from these studies have been extremely mixed (see, e.g., 
Spohn and Cederblom, 1991, finding support for the hypothesis for the disposition decision but 
not for the duration decision; Spohn and DeLone, 2000, reporting results consistent with the 
liberation hypothesis for some city- and minority-group combinations but not others; Warren, 
Chiricos, and Bales, 2012, finding support for the hypothesis among some offender/case 
type/outcome combinations but not others). Perhaps explanations for these null and even 
contrary results can be found in the newest wave of contextual disparity research (see, e.g., 
Kutateladez et al., 2014; Rehavi and Starr, 2014; Starr, 2015). First, not only might stage of the 
process affect the presence or absence of disparities, but factors like geographic context likely 
matter (see, e.g., Eisenstein et al., 1988; Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer, 1997), and 
                                                        
3 Several researchers have also suggested integrating focal concerns with the liberation 
hypothesis. Lieber and Blowers (2003) took a first step in their study of misdemeanor 
sentencing. They note that while the liberation hypothesis gives a reason why sentiments are 
more influential at lower levels of severity, the hypothesis does not offer an explanation why 
those sentiments might manifest as racial bias. Lieber and Blowers (2003) turn to focal concerns 
to bridge this gap. Ball (2006) also paired focal concerns with the liberation hypothesis in his 
study of prosecutorial plea bargaining, and Guevara et al., (2011) suggest further integration of 
focal concerns and attributional theory as a path for future research.  
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accordingly, we should anticipate null findings in some jurisdictions and the presence of racial 
disparities in others. Second, under certain case constellations, theoretical mechanisms operating 
outside the liberation paradigm (e.g., the stereotype of the young minority male for violent 
crimes) might counteract the more general tendency for disparities to be least when severity is 
greatest. As such, we should not expect to find racial disparities everywhere.  
 With the current study we offer an analytical contribution to the sentencing field by 
testing the liberation hypothesis in a well-suited jurisdictional context. First, we examine the 
entire range of offenses from serious misdemeanors to the most serious felonies—all offenses 
sentenced in the general jurisdiction courts for our population. Second, some prior studies have 
estimated separate regression models for different demographic characteristics which do not 
actually test whether variables of interest (such as offense seriousness and prior record) 
significantly differ by race. Finally, we test the liberation hypothesis in a jurisdiction where 
judges are not confined by sentencing guidelines.  
2.2 Research Expectations  
 Following Bushway and Piehl (2001: 735), we consider “judicial discretion” to be 
“discretion in criminal sentencing regardless of whether a judge or prosecutor is responsible for 
setting a given sentence and regardless of whether the sentence results from a trial or a guilty 
plea.” The judicial discretion enjoyed by courtroom workgroup actors in this study should have 
created an optimal context for race-based differences to manifest along different levels of offense 
severity and prior record. Based upon the liberation hypothesis, we expect judicial decision-
makers to be more punitive towards blacks relative to whites when there is greater ambiguity 
surrounding the sentencing decision. For the more serious offenders, decisions will be dominated 
by the magnitude of the offense or record of the offender. But where offense severity and prior 
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record are lower, the question of appropriate punishment becomes less clear, and opportunities 
for the influence of extralegal characteristics like race will likely increase, manifesting in greater 
disparity.  
3. DATA AND METHOD 
The data for this study consist of criminal cases sentenced in South Carolina Circuit 
Courts (the courts of general jurisdiction) for the fiscal year 2001. The South Carolina 
Sentencing Commission (now disbanded) compiled the data to facilitate the creation of advisory 
sentencing guidelines which were proposed to the S.C. General Assembly but never adopted. 
The Circuit Courts have jurisdiction over felony and serious misdemeanor offenses.
4
 We chose 
to analyze all felony cases, as well as cases which South Carolina labeled misdemeanors, but 
which were serious offenses that might be labeled felonies in other jurisdictions. For instance, 
several South Carolina misdemeanors carried maximum penalties of several years in prison with 
some carrying up to 10 years in prison. During FY2001, aggravated assault, obviously a serious 
crime and one of the most common offenses in the data, was labeled by South Carolina law as an 
                                                        
4
 During FY2001, lower level magistrate courts had jurisdiction to sentence offenses subject to a 
maximum 30 days incarceration, a $500 fine, or both; or up to one year in prison, a $5,500 fine, 
or both upon transfer from the Circuit Court (S.C. Code §§ 22-3-550, -545). Criminal jurisdiction 
for all other cases rested with the Circuit Courts (S.C. Code § 14-25-65). The Commission data 
did not contain a record of all misdemeanor offenders sentenced in the lower courts. Because 
neither the complete population nor a representative sample of misdemeanor offenders was 
available, it was not possible to examine the universe of misdemeanor and felony sentencing 
outcomes. Accordingly, we included all felonies and serious misdemeanors carrying the potential 
for more than one-year incarceration, which is the traditional definition of a felony offense 
(McAninch, et al., 2007). This allowed us to include offenses which were deemed serious 
enough by the S.C. legislature to merit the potential for more than a year in prison, while also 
removing the unrepresentative portion of misdemeanor offenses that happened to have been 
sentenced in Circuit Court rather than a lower-level court. Classifying offenses this way also 
makes these analyses more comparable to the existing research on felony sentencing conducted 
in other states, rather than constituting a study marked by anomalous state law designations.  
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unclassified misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. Excluding such serious 
offenses solely due to the designation as misdemeanor rather than felony seemed inappropriate. 
Accordingly, we included all misdemeanors that met the traditional definition of a felony—that 
is, subject to a custody sentence of more than one year in prison.
5
  
The original Commission data did not include whether offenders pled guilty or were 
sentenced after a trial. Because prior research has found mode of disposition to be a significant 
predictor of both the incarceration and sentence length decision (Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; 
Spohn, 2009), we supplemented the Commission data with the mode of disposition through a 
request to S.C. Court Administration.
6
 The data also included 429 individuals who were 
sentenced twice in FY2001 and comprised two separate cases. In these instances, only the most 
serious offense entry was kept. The Commission data did not distinguish Hispanic offenders and 
apparently accounted for non-white and non-black offenders inconsistently. As such, we dropped 
221 individuals whose race was entered as “other.” Four cases were deleted for missing data on 
offense seriousness, and 2 were dropped for missing offender race. These delimitations resulted 
in a dataset of 17,671 offender cases, including 6,611 offenders who were incarcerated (i.e., 
sentenced to a prison term greater than 0). These cases represented all offenders convicted of a 
                                                        
5
 While misdemeanors with potential prison sentences of more than one year were included as 
the lowest offense severity level, we recoded the unclassified common law offenses which were 
subject to 10 year maximums as Class E felonies because Class E felonies were capped at a 
maximum of 10 years (S.C. Code Ann. Sections 17-25-20, 17-25-30; McAninch, Fairey, and 
Coggiola 2007). 
6
 Starting with the supplemental Court Administration list of all criminal cases that went to trial 
in FY2001, we successfully matched 85% of these (260 of 306 total trials) with the Commission 
data. Some of the failed matches were sealed cases listed in the supplemental Court 
Administration data that might have been excluded from the Commission’s dataset, while other 
cases failed to match for unknown reasons.  
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felony (or serious misdemeanor carrying a maximum of a year or more in prison) who were 
sentenced by active Circuit Judges in the general jurisdiction courts for FY2001.  
3.1 Measures 
 A brief description of the measures, as well as summary statistics, is provided in Table 1. 
Our primary dependent variable, prison term, is an offender’s expected minimum sentence, 
which helps account for the non-uniform nature of parole eligibility for South Carolina offenses 
(Freiberger and Hilinski, 2013; see also Chiricos and Bales, 1991; Spohn and Cederblom, 
1991).
7 8 Because the data include extreme outliers such as life and death sentences, we top 
coded 0.44% of the cases at a maximum of 720 months, or an expected minimum sentence of 60 
years in prison.
9
 
                                                        
7
 The expected minimum sentence was chosen over other alternatives because offenders might 
have been eligible for parole after serving 25 percent, 33 percent, or 85 percent of their 
sentences, or may never have been eligible, depending upon the classification of the offense. 
Using the expected minimum rather than the imposed maximum accounted for these differences 
in parole eligibility (Chiricos and Bales, 1991; Gertz and Price, 1985; Spohn and Cederblom, 
1991). The expected minimum was calculated by adjusting the imposed maximum sentence by a 
parole eligibility multiplier as determined by the controlling offense (e.g., 0.25, 0.33, 0.85, 1.0) 
and rounded up to the nearest month (less than 200 of the 17,671 original sentences are non-
integers). For example, if an offender was sentenced to 10 years and fell under the 25 percent 
parole eligibility designation, the expected minimum would be 2.5 years (10 x .25), or 30 
months. 
8
 We were not able to discern between prison and jail sentences. Defendants sentenced to more 
than three months custodial time are processed into the state correctional system; defendants 
given less than three months serve their time in local jails or detention centers. Thus, unlike in 
some states, Circuit Court judges do not make an independent decision whether to send 
incarcerated offenders to a local jail or central prison—that decision is a product of the length of 
the sentence imposed. 
9
 Choosing a cut-point for the top coding is somewhat arbitrary, and some scholars have used 
other operationalizations (e.g., Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008, top coded at 470 months 
based on the federal sentencing commission’s convention of using 470 months as representative 
of a life sentence). Our findings were robust to other coding decisions. For example, we ran 
supplemental models that altered the value of right-censoring, omitted life and death sentences 
altogether, and used the unmodified (raw) sentence, and our substantive findings were not 
meaningfully different across models. 
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 We also included case and offender measures generally found in sentencing research. 
Offense seriousness is an ordinal measure of the severity of a crime based upon the S.C. Crime 
Classification Scheme. Offenses were coded ‘1’ for misdemeanors carrying a possible sentence 
of over a year in prison, ‘2’ for Class F Felonies, ‘3’ for Class E Felonies, ‘4’ for Class D 
Felonies, and ‘5’ for Class A, B, or C Felonies (or Unclassified Felonies). The S.C. Sentencing 
Commission also created a measure of an offender’s criminal history, for which 4 points were 
assigned for each prior violent or drug trafficking conviction with a sentence of a year or greater, 
2 points for prior sentences of less than a year, and 1 point (up to a maximum of five) for prior 
non-incarceration convictions. Offenders with a score of ‘0’ were deemed to have had no prior 
criminal history, while those with ‘1 to 3’ had minimal, ‘4-12’ had moderate, ‘13-20’ had 
considerable, and ‘21 and over’ had extensive criminal histories. 
Commitment score is an ordinal measure based upon the number and severity of the 
offenses for which one was currently found guilty. All offenders received 1 point for their main 
offense. Beyond that, offenders were given 1 point for each additional count or offense unless 
any of those additional offenses were for an A, B, C, or Exempt Felony offense; in these 
instances, 4 points were added to the commitment score. The points were then summed to create 
the multiple offense score (top-coded at 12).
10
 Offense type is a 4-cateogry nominal indicator for 
the type of crime committed: Violent crimes (including drug trafficking), property crimes, drug 
crimes, and other crimes. Dummy variables were created from this nominal measure with violent 
crimes serving as the reference category. Trial is a binary indicator of whether the offender was 
                                                        
10
 Note that the commitment score was constructed post hoc by the Commission and thus was not 
available to or considered by the sentencing judge. It is included as a proxy to measure the nature 
and number of offenses for those individuals sentenced after pleading guilty or being found 
guilty of multiple offenses, which are not otherwise accounted for, but which likely would be 
considered by the sentencing judge. 
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found guilty after a trial rather than entering a guilty plea. In addition, mandatory minimums can 
have pronounced effects on sentencing outcomes (Kautt and DeLone, 2006; Rehavi and Starr, 
2014). Thus, we included mandatory minimum as a binary indicator identifying the 34 offense 
codes which carried a non-suspendable mandatory prison term. 
Finally, we included several extralegal characteristics, the most important of which for 
our purposes is the race of the offender. Black is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
offender was African American or white (reference category). Male indicates the offender’s 
gender (female is the reference category). Age is the age of the offender (in years) at the time of 
admission, and the quadratic term for age is included in the model to explicitly capture any 
potential nonlinear effects. 
3.2 Analytic Strategy 
We propose a method established for event counts that will allow researchers to properly 
estimate models for criminal sentencing outcomes.
11
 From our perspective, criminal sentences 
are essentially counts of the number of months that an offender has been sentenced to prison. As 
the name implies, event counts measure the frequency of an event for a given observation period 
                                                        
11
 To address potential selection bias in this two-stage modeling, scholars sometimes incorporate 
a Heckman correction (e.g., Nobiling et al. 1998; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2001; Ulmer and 
Johnson 2004). However, Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum (2007) note that the execution of the 
Heckman correction in sentencing studies has been highly problematic. Among the most serious 
problems is the near ubiquitous failure to incorporate an exclusion restriction, which requires at 
least one variable that affects the selection process but not the substantive equation of interest. 
As a result, Bushway and colleagues caution that employing the Heckman correction may cause 
more harm than good in many instances. Since the Bushway et al. (2007) article was published, 
many scholars have considered but not reported Heckman corrected models (e.g., Doerner and 
Demuth, 2010; Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008; Lieber and Johnson, 2008; Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2008). Were we to estimate an OLS model rather than the one we 
introduce here, we would also proceed without a Heckman correction because (1) we are unable 
to identify an exclusion restriction; and (2) the condition number for our independent variables, 
including interaction terms, is well above the suggested rule of thumb of 20 (see Bushway, 
Johnson, and Slocum, 2007: 168-69).   
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(Zorn, 1996). Modeling event counts can be problematic because they are non-negative integers 
bounded at zero, usually concentrated among a few small discrete values, and generally 
heteroskedastic with the variance increasing with the mean (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). For 
example, the distribution of our sentencing measure is characterized by extreme positive skew, in 
which the mode and median are 0 months in prison (63% of the total cases), while the mean is a 
prison sentence of just over 16 months. The non-normality of sentencing outcomes can be seen 
graphically in Figure 1. 
As Long (1997: 217) and others note, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to 
analyze untransformed event counts is inadvisable because OLS can cause “inefficient, 
inconsistent, and biased estimates.” As a workaround, many criminal sentencing scholars have 
opted to use a log-transformed measure of sentence length for those who are incarcerated (e.g., 
Freiberger and Hilinski, 2013; Spohn and Cederblom, 1991; Spohn and DeLone, 2000; 
Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). This common 
practice has arisen largely because of the unique nature of sentencing dependent variables, most 
notably their highly skewed, non-negative, and intrinsically heteroscedastic distributions 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).  
Fischman and Schanzenbach (2012: fn.20) defend this practice in the sentencing context: 
“OLS regression with robust standard errors still provides consistent estimates, even when the 
error terms are not normally distributed.” Yet, Santos, Silva, and Tenreyo (2006: 641) 
demonstrate that “in the presence of heteroskedasticity, estimates obtained using log-linearized 
models are severely biased, distorting the interpretation of the model.” They show that this bias 
occurs because the expected value of a log-transformed variable depends on higher-order 
moments of its distribution. In other words, “if the errors are heteroskedastic, the transformed 
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errors will be generally correlated with the covariates” (Santos, Silva, and Tenreyo, 2006: 653). 
Hilbe (2014: 17) also argues that “when the count response is logged and modeled using linear 
regression, its predicted values are nearly always distant from the actual or observed counts.” 
Hilbe emphatically advises: “Reject the temptation to use linear regression to model a logged 
count” (Hilbe, 2014: 17, emphasis in original).12  
 When a count variable contains a high proportion of zeros and overdispersion such as the 
sentencing outcome in the current study, hurdle and zero-inflated models may be more 
appropriate than the Poisson or Negative Binomial distributions typically used to model event 
counts. Hurdle and zero-inflated models account for excess zeros by combining a binary model 
with a count model. For hurdle models, a logit (or probit) is used to predict observations that 
have zero counts, and a zero-truncated count model (e.g., the Negative Binomial) predicts the 
remaining non-zero cases (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013; Hilbe, 2014; King, 1988; Long and 
Freese, 2014; Mullahy, 1986; Zorn, 1996). In this two-stage process, we assume there is a 
threshold, or “hurdle,” that must be surpassed in order to observe a positive count (e.g., time in 
prison). In theory, it is possible for any observation to cross this hurdle. In contrast, zero-inflated 
models assume that there are two distinct processes responsible for generating zeros in the data: 
One structural source, for which a positive count is never observed, and another source for which 
a positive count may or may not occur (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013; Lambert, 1992; Long and 
Freese, 2014; Zorn, 1996). Thus, the zero-inflated model simultaneously estimates a binary 
                                                        
12
 For our sentencing data we found evidence that an OLS model would indeed violate the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. Informal plots of the residuals versus fitted values and formal 
tests for heteroscedasticity such as Cameron and Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-test, White’s 
General Test, and the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test detect heteroscedasticity indicate 
that the null hypothesis of constant error variance has been violated. Further, while logging the 
dependent variable does reduce heteroscedasticity in our data, we still find significant levels in 
diagnostic plots and tests of the transformed criminal sentence. 
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inflation equation that generates “excess” zeros, as well as a Poisson or Negative Binomial 
model for the remaining zero and non-zero counts. 
In practice, the results from hurdle and zero-inflated models are usually very similar (e.g., 
see Zorn, 1996); yet, their underlying assumptions about the source of high zero counts should 
dictate which method is more appropriate. In our case, we have no reason to suspect that there is 
a structural source of zeros, in which a group of criminal offenders would never be sentenced to 
prison. For instance, even for the lowest level of offense seriousness and criminal history, the 
proportion of those incarcerated is .14 and .19, respectively.
13
 Thus, a hurdle model seems more 
appropriate for our data, especially given that it maps onto existing theories of judicial decision-
making in which judges are assumed to first decide whether to incarcerate an offender and then 
determine for how long (e.g., see Spohn and Cederblom, 1991; Spohn, 2009). 
Formally, the Hurdle Regression Model using the Negative Binomial distribution (HRM-
NB) is a combination of the logit model to predict 0s (Equation 1) and the modified zero-
truncated negative binomial model to predict positive counts (Equation 2) (see Long and Freese, 
2014, p. 520; 527-528):  
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝐱𝑖) =
exp⁡(𝑥𝑖𝛾)
1 + exp⁡(𝑥𝑖𝛾)
= 𝜋𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡[Eq. 1]⁡ 
Pr(𝑦𝑖|𝐱𝑖) = (1 − 𝜋𝑖)
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13
 Even the combination of minimal values for offense seriousness and criminal history leads to a 
non-trivial probability of incarceration, as the proportion of those sentenced to prison with these 
attributes is .034. A zero-inflated model might be appropriate in the sentencing context, however, 
where the data also included infractions for which active incarceration was never an option. We 
also note that Anderson, Kling, and Stith (1999) used a zero-inflated negative binomial model to 
examine inter-judge disparity before and after the federal sentencing guidelines became binding. 
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whereγ is a set of covariates that determines the incarceration decision; Γ(∙) is the gamma 
function, α is a dispersion parameter, and µi = exp(xiβ). In this two-equation model, 0 is 
conceptualized as the “hurdle” that must be passed before we can observe a positive count. 
Although these models can be estimated individually, “the two processes are conjoined using the 
log-likelihood…[which] is the log of the probability of y = 0 plus the log of y = 1 plus the log of 
y being a positive count” (Hilbe, 2014: 185). 
 As a brief demonstration that our hurdle model provides unbiased estimates of 
overdispersed count data with a high proportion of zeros, we conducted a series of Monte Carlo 
simulations testing different modeling strategies (for an accessible discussion of simulations, see 
Carsey and Hardin, 2014). To this end, we specified a data-generating process that mirrored our 
sentencing outcome and then regressed this variable on a single explanatory predictor using OLS 
and distributions for other count models.
14
 We also tried to include a Heckman-corrected model 
using the logged sentencing outcome, which is a common approach in criminology, but this 
model repeatedly failed to estimate during the Monte Carlo simulations (possibly due to the 
absence of a required exclusion restriction). We present the results from these simulations in 
Table 2. 
One advantage of the Monte Carlo simulations is that we know the true value of the 
population parameter: β = 0.5. As reported in Column 2 of Table 2, only the Hurdle Regression 
Model using the Negative Binomial (HRM-NB) and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) 
models provide unbiased estimates of ?̂? (standard errors are listed in Column 3). The difference 
among the various models becomes even more apparent when we consider the percentage of 
                                                        
14
 The R replication code is available upon request. 
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relative bias resulting from each method in Column 4. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model 
of the untransformed outcome provides wildly inaccurate estimates of the true effect (a relative 
bias of more than 1,000%), and while other count models come closer to the true estimate, only 
the models designed to account for zero-inflation and overdispersion produce trivial percentages 
of relative bias (< 0.1%). White’s test confirms a significant degree of heteroscedasticity even for 
the log-transformed OLS model, 𝜒2(1) = 25.2, p < .001, which means that the OLS model of the 
log-transformed outcome will produce biased estimates because of the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. Column 5 contains the coverage probabilities from the various models, which 
are the proportions of the time that the confidence intervals actually contain the true value of 
interest. Again, only the HRM-NB and ZINB have acceptable coverage probabilities of .95; all 
of the remaining models have coverage probabilities of .10 or less. Finally, a comparative 
goodness-of-fit measure, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), is presented in the last column. 
In general, the lower the value of AIC, the better the model fit; thus, the HRM-NB or ZINB 
should be preferred over alternative specifications. 
 To summarize, the HRM-NB provides unbiased estimates of our highly skewed 
sentencing outcome, despite the overdispersion and the presence of a high proportion of real 
zeros in the data.
15
 We now turn to the substantive findings that address our theoretical question 
                                                        
15 For purposes of comparison, we specified three different counts models—the Poisson 
Regression Model (PRM), Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM), and the HRM-NB—
to determine the best fit for our sentencing data. For the HRM-NB model, we used the same set 
of predictors for the incarceration decision as we did for the truncated sentencing count. First, we 
calculated mean predicted probabilities for each model, and then created a difference measure of 
the observed and predicted counts (Long and Freese, 2014). The ideal model would be one in 
which all plot points fall at 0, as this would indicate that our model perfectly predicted the 
observed data (i.e., observed – predicted = 0). The HRM-NB fit the data best, hovering closely 
around the reference line at zero. Second, because the NBRM reduces to the PRM when the 
overdispersion parameter, α, is equal to zero, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of the null hypothesis 
(H0: α = 0) can be conducted. In our case, α > 0, and the resulting high value for the χ
2
 statistic 
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whether, as the liberation hypothesis supposes, racial disparities are more likely to manifest at 
lower levels of crime seriousness or criminal history.  
4. RESULTS 
4.1 The Incarceration Decision 
We begin by analyzing the effects of various case, offender, and extralegal characteristics 
on sentencing decisions. To this end, we regressed prison term on the set of case and offender 
characteristics described in the measures section, as well as two interaction terms that 
specifically test the liberation hypothesis:
 16
  
𝑥𝑖𝛽 = 𝛽1(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒⁡𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔⁡𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒⁡)
+ 𝛽4(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦⁡𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒⁡) + 𝛽5(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟⁡𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽6(𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙)
+ +𝛽7(𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦⁡𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚) + 𝛽8(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) + 𝛽9(𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒)
+ 𝛽10(𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽11(𝐴𝑔𝑒)
2 + 𝛽12(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘)
+ 𝛽13(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒⁡𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)+⁡𝛽14(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦) 
We report the findings from the binary portion of the HRM-NB in Table 3, which shows the 
factors predicting whether an offender will be incarcerated. To help provide a meaningful 
interpretation of these nonlinear results, we also present average marginal effects (AMEs) in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
led us to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the NBRM should be preferred over the 
PRM. Third, Greene (1994) proposes using a Vuong test (V) for non-nested models like the 
NBRM and the HRM-NB. If V > 1.96, the first model is preferred; if V < -1.96, the second 
model provides a better fit. Using guidance provided by Long and Freese (2014), we computed V 
for the PRM vs. HRM-NB, as well as the NBRM vs. HRM-NB. The results of the Vuong test 
strongly support the HRM-NB over alternative count models such as the PRM and the NBRM, 
as V is well below the specified cutoff of -1.96. 
16
 We also have data on the judge responsible for the sentencing decision for more than 99% of 
the cases in our data, which is important as we would expect sentencing decisions to be clustered 
by judge. Moulton (1990) demonstrates that failure to properly account for clustering can lead to 
massive underestimation of standard errors and flawed hypothesis tests.  
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Table 3 and graphically in Figure 2, which provide metrics of discrete or instantaneous rates of 
change in predictions for different values of interest.
17
 The main effects are generally in keeping 
with recent studies from guidelines jurisdictions and show that legal characteristics like offense 
severity, prior record, and mandatory minimum offenses are among the strongest predictors of 
the in/out decision. For example, a one-level increase in offense severity (e.g., moving from a 
Serious Misdemeanor to a Class F Felony) increases the likelihood of being incarcerated by .09. 
Thus, moving from the least to most serious offense increases the predicted probability of 
incarceration by .36 (given that offense seriousness is measured on a 5-point scale). Each one-
category step up in criminal history increases the likelihood of incarceration by .13, and moving 
from the lowest to highest score on this 5-point measure amounts to change in predicted 
probabilities of .52. The mode of disposition exerts a substantial impact on the likelihood of a 
prison sentence: the AME indicates that the difference in predicted probabilities is .41 for a trial 
conviction versus a guilty plea. Consistent with the prior literature and expectations, most of the 
extralegal characteristics exert a modest but statistically significant influence. The difference in 
incarceration rates for males relative to females is .08, while the difference is .06 for black 
offenders. However, age (and its squared term) does not appear to influence the outcome.  
                                                        
17
 For a dummy variable, the AME is the mean of differences in predictions for each observation 
(leaving all other values unchanged in the data) when moving from 0 to 1 for that variable. For 
example, the marginal effect of race for a single observation is the difference in the predicted 
number of months sentenced to prison assuming that the offender’s race was first coded as 
‘white’ and then as ‘black’. To obtain the AME, we simply take the mean of these individual 
marginal effects, which allows us to compare the effect of race for two hypothetical 
populations—one all black and one all white—on criminal sentencing decisions (for more 
information about marginal effects, see Williams, 2012). For a continuous variable, the AME is 
the mean of instantaneous rates of change—that is, the mean of the slopes—at each value of the 
variable over all observations (leaving the rest of the data unchanged). Thus, the AME for a 
continuous variable provides a good approximation for the amount of change in Y given a 1-unit 
change in Xi.  
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For the interaction terms, only black x criminal history is statistically significant and 
consistent with the liberation hypothesis. The results show that offense seriousness does not 
significantly moderate the effects of race for the decision to incarcerate. Thus, contrary to the 
liberation hypothesis, the effect of race is not more pronounced at lower levels of offense 
seriousness where judges were theorized to have more freedom to allow extralegal characteristics 
like race to influence their decisions. Figure 3 provides a plot of the marginal effects of being 
black relative to white at different values of criminal history. As predicted, blacks are more 
likely to be sent to prison compared to whites only at lower levels of prior record; this 
incarceration disparity decreases as criminal history increases. The difference in the probability 
of incarceration for blacks with no or minimal criminal history is .07 relative to whites, while at 
the highest levels of criminal history blacks and whites have the same likelihood of avoiding 
prison. In sum, the effect of being black is mitigated as criminal history increases in keeping with 
the liberation hypothesis.  
4.2 The Sentence Length Decision  
As reported in Table 4, legal characteristics are the strongest drivers of the prison length 
determination, and there is also a strong trial penalty. Offense seriousness, current commitment 
score, trial, and mandatory minimum offenses all increase the number of months imposed, while 
being sentenced for property, drug, and other offenses compared to violent offenses are all 
associated with shorter prison terms. For the offender characteristics, criminal history and the 
age measures are not significant, while males and blacks are sentenced differently than females 
and whites.
18
 The AMEs reported in Column 2 of Table 4 and graphically in Figure 4 reveal the 
                                                        
18
 We also specified a generalized negative binomial model using the gnbreg command in Stata 
which allowed us to explicitly model the predictors that contribute to ovedispersion in the count 
response. We discovered that many of the case characteristics—but not offender attributes—
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most substantial effects on sentence length include the legal characteristics of offense severity, 
mandatory minimum offense, and the trial disposition indicator. Each severity level increases the 
average prison term by over two years while being convicted of a mandatory minimum offense is 
associated with an additional 41 months. Being found guilty after trial rather than a plea is 
particularly salient, as it adds nearly 5 years to the length of the average prison term. Among the 
extra-legal offender characteristics, males receive about additional 3 months compared to 
females, and blacks receive on average 5 fewer months compared to whites. 
For the interaction terms, offense seriousness moderates race in a manner somewhat 
consistent with the liberation hypothesis, as we find a significant black x offense seriousness 
interaction. Figure 5 plots the marginal effect of being black at different levels of offense 
seriousness. This figure shows that black offenders are more likely to receive additional prison 
terms for less serious offenses relative to whites, although the effect size is relatively small. This 
difference in sentences equates to an additional 2 months in prison for serious misdemeanors, 
Class F Felonies, and Class E Felonies; the marginal effect reverses directions for Class D 
Felonies but is not statistically significant. For the most serious felonies, the marginal effects of 
show a net advantage of approximately 1 year less for black offenders. It is worth noting that the 
standard errors are much larger for this marginal effect (i.e., roughly 10 times the size of the 
standard errors for the lowest severity category). There is a notable curvilinear pattern in which 
the effect of being black slightly increases across low and mid-level severity offenses before 
dropping drastically for the most severe offenses.  
Given that criminal history did not significantly predict positive prison sentences, we 
conducted supplemental analyses in which we dummy coded criminal history rather than treating 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
account for overdispersion: offense seriousness, type of offense (drug, property, and other), trial, 
and mandatory minimum are significant predictors. 
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it as an ordinal measure. Several scholars have reported that this alternative specification has 
increased the explained variance of their sentencing models in guidelines jurisdictions (e.g., 
Bushway and Piehl, 2001; Engen and Gainey, 2000; Mustard, 2001), and they have also found 
that the effects sizes of extralegal characteristics like race actually declined as a result (Bushway 
and Piehl, 2001). However, our dummy coding of criminal history did not increase model fit, and 
the proportion of explained variance in our sentencing outcome remained virtually unchanged for 
these non-guidelines data (i.e., Nagelkerke R
2
 for both models was .71). In addition, the dummy 
coding of criminal history increased the number of parameters in the model from 2 to 8, thereby 
also increasing the likelihood of committing a Type I error. Differences in the main effect of 
history were minor and depended upon the excluded category; in most cases, the black x criminal 
history interactions were not statistically significant leading us to conclude that there was little 
added benefit to the alternative model.
19
  
5. DISCUSSION 
 The liberation hypothesis posits that for the most serious criminal offenses and the most 
seasoned repeat criminal offenders, judges will feel little choice but to impose severe punishment 
regardless of extralegal factors like race. Yet, in more ambiguous contexts, judges will be 
“liberated” from the constraints of extreme severity and criminality; in these instances the door 
opens for extralegal characteristics such as race to influence sentencing decisions. We tested this 
                                                        
19 For the main effects of history in the dummy-coded model, the no-history group appeared to 
receive longer average sentences than some of the other categories. This seems counterintuitive, 
but most offenders with no criminal history would not be expected to be imprisoned in the first 
place; for those first offenders who were sent to prison, it is possible that some aspect of the case 
or offender that led to the exceptional disposition of prison (e.g., harm to victim, the demeanor or 
attitude of the defendant, etc.), also resulted in a comparatively punitive sentence length. Where 
differences were statistically significant, they were modest at best. Results are available upon 
request from the first author.  
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theory in a jurisdiction without the constraints of sentencing guidelines; the large grants of 
discretion in South Carolina make it an ideal location for examining the hypothesis.  
 We found strong support for the liberation hypothesis when considering how race 
interacts with criminal history for the incarceration decision. These results are consistent with the 
idea that when offenders have accrued a substantial record of past convictions, their criminal 
history has a constraining effect that neutralizes the influence of race: judicial decision makers 
are equally likely to impose a prison term on offenders with extensive records, regardless of their 
race. However, for the many offenders who do not have extensive records, presumably a whole 
panoply of factors can influence the in/out decisions of courtroom workgroups. Among these 
low-history offenders, race effects become significant and fairly strong, with blacks being 5%-
7% more likely to be incarcerated compared to whites. Once the decision-making process moves 
to the sentence length determination, the liberation mechanism appeared to operate differently. 
For instance, we did not find a statistically significant race x criminal history interaction; instead 
we found some support for the hypothesis with a significant race x severity interaction. Low 
severity black offenders received slightly longer sentences than whites; yet, high severity black 
offenders appear to have received shorter average sentences than whites. The standard errors and 
resulting confidence intervals are quite large for this latter effect leading us to consider these 
results with some caution. It is possible that with these high severity offenses, unmeasured case-
specific facts about the victim and the nature of the conduct render the race effects unstable.  
 Consequently, our study adds to the body of studies which find mixed or equivocal 
support for the liberation hypothesis. On one hand, our results harmonize with Spohn and 
Cederblom (1991) who found support for the hypothesis for the disposition decision but not the 
length duration. However, even this pattern is not universal. Spohn and DeLone (2000) found 
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support for the liberation hypothesis in some jurisdictions but not others, and Warren et al. 
(2012) report a complex set of findings in which support for the hypothesis varies among various 
offender/case/outcome combinations. It is possible that the liberation hypothesis is simply too 
parsimonious to accurately account for many of the individual, group, and contextual processes 
at play in sentencing decisions. One of many possibilities here involves the potentially unseen 
impact of the victim. The majority of violent crime is intra-racial, and one theory of bias in the 
criminal justice system is that court decision-makers undervalue black victims (see Baldus, 
Pulaski, and Woodworth, 1983; Blumstein, 1993). Since black victims are most likely to be 
victimized by black offenders, if courtroom actors do sentence crimes with black victims less 
punitively, this practice could confound the race x severity interaction and actually result in a 
black advantage at high severity levels that encompass violent crimes against the person. Perhaps 
the most effective line of inquiry into these different processes would be qualitative research 
among courtroom workgroup members—a call that has been renewed by many in recent years 
(see Baumer, 2013; Ulmer, 2012).  
 Interestingly, the main effect of criminal history was not a significant predictor of the 
sentence length determination. This is a particularly noteworthy finding coming from a non-
guidelines state, since guidelines jurisdictions build in prior record as one of the two 
determinants of both the incarceration and sentence length decision. Sentencing scholars have 
noted that in this way some guidelines may actually be building racial disparities into the formal 
sentencing structure, as black offenders typically have more significant criminal records than 
whites (Tonry 1995, 1996). Frase (2009), for example, demonstrated that in Minnesota a full 
two-thirds of the race disparity in the guidelines recommendations of presumptive prison 
sentences was attributable to criminal history. The South Carolina judges in the current study, 
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unconstrained by sentencing guidelines, did consider prior record to be highly relevant for the 
decision to incarcerate—in fact, it was the third strongest predictor following mandatory 
minimum and trial disposition. However, criminal history did not influence sentence length for 
those sent to prison. If the typical sentencing guidelines grid had been in effect in South 
Carolina, offenders with longer prior records would presumably have been recommended for 
much longer sentences than these judges deemed appropriate. While this criminal history finding 
seems counterintuitive, it is not without precedent. For example, in Levin’s (1977: 102) classic 
study, he observed that “in Minneapolis defendants with a prior record receive much more severe 
sentences than those without one. This pattern does not occur in Pittsburgh sentencing.” Thus, 
while it is highly likely that criminal history has some relevance in most jurisdictions, the 
significance of prior record may well be a component of the legal culture of a jurisdiction that 
varies according to outcome and location.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The current research offers several contributions to the literature. Given the indeterminate 
nature of South Carolina sentencing law and its lack of guidelines to constrain judicial decision-
making, these data provide a unique opportunity to test the liberation hypothesis since judicial 
discretion, and thus the opportunity for extralegal disparities to manifest, should be present to a 
greater extent than that found in guidelines jurisdictions where most recent sentencing research 
has been conducted. However, there are several notable limitations to our research. Our data are 
from only one year and one jurisdiction. Like much of the sentencing research, we lack 
potentially important controls such as whether an offender had been detained prior to trial, his or 
her socioeconomic status, whether they had dependent children, and information related to the 
victim. And since the jurisdiction is in the South and in a state with a comparatively high black 
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population, it is unclear whether similar results would be found in non-guidelines jurisdictions in 
other regions of the country.    
The results from our analyses provide some support for the liberation hypothesis. First, 
for the in/out decision, the main effect for race was statistically significant, with blacks being 
about 6% more likely to be incarcerated holding the other relevant variables constant. This black 
penalty did not vary by offense seriousness as proposed by the liberation hypothesis, but an even 
greater effect of race did exist at lower levels of prior record. This finding was consistent with 
the hypothesis that with extensive offenders, judges will feel little choice but to incarcerate, 
while at lower criminal history levels the extralegal effect of race becomes more prevalent. With 
the sentence length decision, the moderating factors differed: no race differences were found for 
criminal history, but blacks were more likely to be sentenced to longer terms of incarceration 
when convicted for less severe offenses (yet received shorter sentences for the most severe 
category of crimes).  
To test for the liberation hypothesis, we employed a hurdle count model which aptly fit 
the positively skewed imprisonment decision frequently found in sentencing data. While similar 
count models have been used in other areas of criminology and criminal justice (e.g., see 
MacDonald and Lattimore, 2010), researchers have yet to embrace them in sentencing studies. 
We demonstrated through a series of Monte Carlo simulations that the hurdle model returned 
unbiased estimates compared to alternative modeling approaches. As sentencing scholars 
continue to utilize advancements in statistical modeling strategies (see, e.g., Johnson, 2012; 
MacDonald and Lattimore, 2010) researchers may wish to consider count models given the 
nature and distribution of sentencing outcomes.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of Event Counts, Expected Minimum Prison Term (in Months) 
 
Notes: N = 17,671. Expected minimum prison terms range from 0 to 720 months; M = 16.2, SD 
= 64.4; Mdn = 0; Mode = 0.  
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Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects of Case and Offender Characteristics on the Probability of 
Being Incarcerated. 
 
 
 
Notes: Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) are calculated from the logistic regression equation of 
the hurdle regression model with bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications clustered by 
sentencing judge, 51 in total). For dummy variables, the AME is the mean of differences in 
predictions for each observation when moving from 0 to 1, leaving the rest of the data 
unchanged. For continuous predictors, the AME is the mean of instantaneous rates of change at 
each value for every observation, leaving the rest of the data unchanged. Confidence intervals 
surround point estimates. N = 17,671. 
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Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Being Black on the Likelihood of Incarceration (Black – White) 
 
Notes: Marginal effects at representative values (MERs) are derived from the logistic regression 
equation of the hurdle regression model with bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications 
clustered by sentencing judge, 51 in total). MERs compare the predicted probability of being 
incarcerated for black vs. white offenders. Positive plot points indicate that a black offender is 
more likely to be incarcerated relative to a white offender depending upon his or her criminal 
history. Error bars are the 95% confidence intervals for the estimated marginal effects. N = 
17,671.  
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Figure 4. Average Marginal Effects of Case and Offender Characteristics on Predicted Prison 
Sentence (in Months) for those Incarcerated. 
 
Notes: Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) are calculated from the zero-truncated negative 
binomial equation of the hurdle regression model with bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 
replications clustered by sentencing judge, 51 in total). For dummy variables, the AME is the 
mean of differences in predictions for each observation when moving from 0 to 1, leaving the 
rest of the data unchanged. For continuous predictors, the AME is the mean of instantaneous 
rates of change at each value for every observation, leaving the rest of the data unchanged. 
Confidence intervals surround point estimates. N = 17,671. 
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Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Being Black on the Predicted Prison Term (in Months) 
 
Notes: Marginal effects at representative values (MERs) are derived from the count equation of 
the ZINB model. MERs compare the predicted count (number of months in Prison) for black vs. 
white offenders at different values of offense seriousness. MERs compare the predicted prison 
term for incarcerated black vs. white offenders. Positive plot points indicate that a black offender 
receives a longer prison term than a white offender depending upon the seriousness of the 
offense. Predicted counts are listed above point estimates, and error bars are the 95% confidence 
intervals for the estimated marginal effects. N = 17,671.   
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Table 1. Description of Variables 
Variable Description Code Summary Statistics 
Dependent Variable   % n 
Prison Term Expected minimum # of months sentenced 
(0 to 720 months) 
  Mean = 16.2 
Std. Dev. = 64.4 
Case Characteristics     
Offense Seriousness 5-level ordinal score 
From the S.C. Crime Classification Scheme 
1 = Misdemeanor 
2 = Felony (Class F) 
3 = Felony (Class E) 
4 = Felony (Class D) 
5 = Felony (Class A, B, 
C, or Unclassified) 
15.3% 
46.0% 
19.6% 
11.0% 
8.2% 
2,694 
8,136 
3,455 
1,942 
1,444 
Commitment Score 12-level ordinal measure  
Number of commitment offenses 
1 = Less Serious 
12 = Very Serious 
Mean = 1.9 
Std. Dev. = 1.8 
Offense Type 4-category nominal indicator of the classification 
of crime committed 
(Violent offenses are the reference category) 
1 = Violent 
2 = Drug 
3 = Property 
4 = Other 
34.3% 
14.5% 
33.2% 
18.0% 
6,065 
2,561 
5,858 
3,187 
Mandatory Minimum Minimum prison sentence mandated 1 = Yes 5.1% 897 
  0 = No 94.9% 16,746 
Trial Found guilty after trial  1 = Guilty after Trial 
0 = Guilty Plea 
1.5% 
98.5% 
258 
17,413 
Offender Characteristics     
Criminal History 5-level ordinal score 
Derived from the number and severity  
of prior offenses 
1 = None 
2 = Minimal 
3 = Moderate 
4 = Considerable 
5 = Extensive 
36.6% 
32.9% 
17.4% 
5.9% 
7.2% 
6,460 
5,806 
3,080 
1,048 
1,277 
Black Race 1 = Black 
0 = White 
62.0% 
38.0% 
10,950 
6,721 
Male Gender 1 = Female 
0 = Male 
16.6% 
83.4% 
2,929 
14,742 
Age Age 
(15 to 81 years old) 
 Mean = 31.3 
Std. Dev. = 10.1 
Notes: Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding errors. 
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Table 2. Monte Carlo Simulations of Methods for Analyzing Overdispersed Count Data with Zero-Inflation 
Model 
?̂? 
(𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒆 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟎) 𝑺?̂? 
Relative Bias (%) 
=⁡
(?̂? − 𝜷)
𝜷
(𝟏𝟎𝟎) 
Coverage 
Probability AIC 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 5.51 0.84 1,001.69% .00 11,481.96 
OLS Log-Linear Model (ln(y) if y > 0)* 0.40 0.02  -- -- 1,125.26
 
Poisson (PRM) 0.37 0.00 -25.40% .01 67,971.73 
Negative Binomial (NBRM) 0.38 0.04 -23.73% .05 4,214.81 
Hurdle Poisson (HRM-P) 0.47 0.00 -5.64% .10 22,895.78 
Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) 0.47 0.00 -5.62% .10 22,889.29 
Hurdle Negative Binomial (HRM-NB) 0.50 0.03 -0.07% .95 4,042.28 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) 0.50 0.03 -0.06% .94 4,032.86 
Notes: Simulations were conducted in R with 10,000 repetitions of N = 1,000 and a seed value of 8675309. The coverage probability 
reveals the proportion of estimated confidence intervals for the simulated samples which contain the true population parameter 
(Carsey and Hardin, 2014). Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a comparative fit statistic. 
 
* The log-linear model for positive values would be combined with a logit/probit model to predict zero counts. AIC for the log-linear 
model is only a partial fit statistic (i.e., when y > 0). Relative bias and coverage probabilities were not calculated for the log-linear 
OLS model because the estimates are not on the raw-scale of y.
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Table 3. Hurdle Model: Logit Estimates for the Incarceration Decision  
 Incarceration 
Decision 
Average Marginal 
Effect 
Case Characteristics  Pr(Prison) 
Offense Seriousness 0.68*** 
(0.06) 
0.09*** 
(0.00) 
Commitment Score 0.32*** 
(0.03) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
Drug Offense -0.67*** 
(0.10) 
-0.09*** 
(0.01) 
Property Offense -0.76*** 
(0.06) 
-0.11*** 
(0.01) 
Other Offense -0.44*** 
(0.10) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Trial 2.69*** 
(0.38) 
0.41*** 
(0.05) 
Mandatory Minimum 3.72*** 
(0.43) 
0.52*** 
(0.03) 
Offender Characteristics   
Criminal History 1.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.01) 
Male 0.60*** 
(0.07) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Age -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Age
2
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Black 1.14*** 
(0.17) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
Liberation Hypothesis   
Black x  
Offense Seriousness 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
 
Black x  
Criminal History 
-0.24*** 
(0.04) 
 
Constant -5.56*** 
(0.31) 
 
Cragg and Uhler’s R2 
0.51  
AICH
 
0.85  
Non-zero Observations (n) 6,611  
N 17,671  
Notes: Judges’ sentencing decisions (prison term in months) modeled using the Hurdle Regression Model 
(HRM) with bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications clustered by sentencing judge; 51 in total). 
For dummy variables, the average marginal effect (AME) is the mean of differences in predictions for 
each observation when moving from 0 to 1, leaving the rest of the data unchanged. For continuous 
predictors, the AME is the mean of instantaneous rates of change at each value for every observation, 
leaving the rest of the data unchanged. Standard errors shown in parentheses. AICH is an enhanced Akaike 
Information Criterion comparative fit test (Hilbe, 2014). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.  
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Table 4. Hurdle Model: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Estimates for the Count Equation 
 Prison Tern Average Marginal 
Effect 
Case Characteristics  in Months 
Offense Seriousness 0.69*** 
(0.02) 
26.08*** 
(1.64) 
Commitment Score 0.10*** 
(0.01) 
4.07*** 
(0.32) 
Drug Offense -0.27*** 
(0.05) 
-11.16*** 
(2.06) 
Property Offense -0.36*** 
(0.03) 
-14.38*** 
(1.23) 
Other Offense -0.40*** 
(0.04) 
-15.61*** 
(1.71) 
Trial 0.95*** 
(0.05) 
57.18*** 
(4.80) 
Mandatory Minimum 0.94*** 
(0.04) 
40.63*** 
(2.43) 
Offender Characteristics   
Criminal History 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.56 
(0.39) 
Male 0.08* 
(0.04) 
3.34* 
(1.56) 
Age
 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.26** 
(0.09) 
Age
2
 0.00 
(0.00) 
 
Black 0.39*** 
(0.09) 
-4.95** 
(1.59) 
Liberation Hypothesis   
Black x Offense Seriousness -0.11*** 
(0.02) 
 
Black x Criminal History 0.00 
(0.02) 
 
Constant 0.26* 
(0.17) 
 
   
Log α -0.59*** 
(0.03) 
 
Cragg and Uhler’s R2 0.72  
AICH 7.63  
N 6,611  
Notes: Judges’ sentencing decisions (prison term in months) modeled using the Hurdle Regression Model 
(HRM) with bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications clustered by sentencing judge; 51 in total). 
For dummy variables, the average marginal effect (AME) is the mean of differences in predictions for 
each observation when moving from 0 to 1, leaving the rest of the data unchanged. For continuous 
predictors, the AME is the mean of instantaneous rates of change at each value for every observation, 
leaving the rest of the data unchanged. Standard errors shown in parentheses. AICH is an enhanced Akaike 
Information Criterion comparative fit test (Hilbe, 2014). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1.  Comparison of HRM-NB and OLS Models for y > 0 
  
HRM-NB 
Outcome: Prison Term   
Log-Linear OLS 
Outcome: ln(Prison Term) 
  coef. S.E. z 
 
coef.  S.E. z 
Case Characteristics 
     Offense Seriousness 0.69 0.02 35.91 
 
0.59 0.02 35.55 
     Commitment Score  0.10 0.01 18.53 
 
0.10 0.00 20.49 
     Drug Offense -0.27 0.05 -5.37 
 
-0.16 0.05 -3.15 
     Property Offense -0.36 0.03 -13.77 
 
-0.26 0.03 -8.56 
     Other Offense -0.40 0.04 -9.44 
 
-0.31 0.03 -9.17 
     Trial  0.95 0.05 20.17 
 
1.03 0.06 16.83 
     Mandatory Minimum 0.94 0.04 21.60 
 
1.09 0.05 20.54 
Offender Characteristics 
     Criminal History  0.01 0.02 0.72 
 
0.02 0.01 2.05 
     Male 0.08 0.04 2.08 
 
0.07 0.04 1.76 
     Age -0.00 0.01 -0.12 
 
-0.01 0.01 -1.25 
     Age
2
 0.00 0.00 1.07 
 
0.00 0.00 2.03 
    Black 0.39 0.09 4.52 
 
0.32 0.08 3.84 
Liberation Hypothesis  
Black x Seriousness -0.11 0.02 -5.94  -0.09 0.02 -4.75 
Black x History 0.00 0.02 0.07  -0.01 0.02 -0.33 
Intercept 0.26 0.17 1.52   0.37 0.16 2.30 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.72    0.66  
Notes: Judges’ sentencing decisions (prison term in months) modeled using bootstrapped standard errors 
with 1,000 replications clustered by sentencing judge (51 in total) for both models. With N = 6,611, 
values of |z| > 1.96 are significant at p < .05. Estimates are not directly comparable between models 
because the scale of the dependent variable is different.
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STATA CODE 
* HRM Part 1: Binary (logit) Model Predicting 0s 
bootstrap, reps(1000) cluster(judge): logit dv1 c.serious##i.black commitment i.offense i.trial 
i.manmin c.history##i.black c.age##c.age i.male 
logit dv1 c.serious##i.black commitment i.offense i.trial i.manmin c.history##i.black 
c.age##c.age i.male, nolog vce(cluster judge) 
* Use Joseph Hilbe's GLME3_software: http://works.bepress.com/joseph_hilbe/60/ 
abich 
margins, dydx(*) noesample vce(unconditional) post 
coefplot, horizontal xline(0) yscale(reverse) recast(scatter)  cismooth grid(none)  ///  
    order(1.manmin 1.trial serious commitment 4.offense 2.offense 3.offense  /// 
    history  1.male 1.black  age )  /// 
    coeflabel(1.manmin="Mandatory Minimum" 1.trial="Trial" history="Criminal History"  /// 
    serious="Offense Seriousness" 1.male="Male" 1.black="Black"  /// 
    commitment="Commitment Score" age="Age" 4.offense="Other Crime"  /// 
    2.offense="Drug Crime" 3.offense="Property Crime", wrap(20))  /// 
    headings(1.manmin="{bf:Case Characteristics}" history="{bf:Offender Characteristics}")  /// 
  xtitle("Average Marginal Effect: Pr(Prison)") 
 
logit dv1 c.serious##i.black commitment i.offense i.trial i.manmin c.history##i.black 
c.age##c.age i.male, nolog vce(cluster judge) 
margins, dydx(black) at(history = (1 (1) 5)) noesample vce(unconditional) post 
coefplot, horizontal xline(0) yscale(reverse) recast(scatter)  cismooth grid(none)  /// 
    coeflabel(1._at="None" 2._at="Minimal" 3._at="Moderate" /// 
    4._at="Considerable" 5._at="Extensive", wrap(20)) /// 
    eqrename(1.black = "Criminal History") eqstrict /// 
    xtitle("Discrete Change in Pr(Prison > 0) for Blacks") 
fitstat 
 
 
* HRM Part 2: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial (ZTBN) Model Predicting Positive Counts 
bootstrap, reps(1000) cluster(judge): tnbreg dv1 c.serious##i.black commitment i.offense i.trial 
i.manmin c.history##i.black c.age##c.age i.male if dv1>0 
tnbreg dv1 c.serious##i.black commitment i.offense i.trial i.manmin c.history##i.black 
c.age##c.age i.male if dv1>0, vce(cluster judge) 
* Use Joseph Hilbe's GLME3_software: http://works.bepress.com/joseph_hilbe/60/ 
abich 
margins, dydx(*) noesample vce(unconditional) post 
coefplot,  horizontal xline(0) yscale(reverse) recast(scatter)  cismooth grid(none)  ///  
    order(1.trial 1.manmin serious commitment 2.offense 3.offense 4.offense  /// 
    1.male history age 1.black)  /// 
    headings(1.trial="{bf:Case Characteristics}" 1.male="{bf:Offender Characteristics}")  /// 
    coeflabel(1.trial="Trial" 1.manmin="Mandatory Minimum" /// 
    history="Criminal History" serious="Offense Seriousness"  /// 
    1.male="Male" 1.black="Black" commitment="Commitment Score" /// 
    age="Age" 4.offense="Other Crime"  /// 
    2.offense="Drug Crime" 3.offense="Property Crime", wrap(20))  /// 
    xtitle("Average Marginal Effect: Predicted Sentence") 
   
tnbreg dv1 c.serious##i.black commitment i.offense i.trial i.manmin c.history##i.black 
c.age##c.age i.male if dv1>0, vce(cluster judge) 
margins, dydx(black) at(serious = (1 (1) 5)) noesample vce(unconditional) post 
coefplot, horizontal xline(0) yscale(reverse) recast(scatter)  cismooth grid(none)  ///  
    coeflabel(1._at="Misdemeanor" 2._at="F Felony" /// 
    3._at="E Felony" 4._at="D Felony" 5._at="A/B/C Felony", wrap(20)) /// 
    eqrename(1.black = "Offense Seriousness") eqstrict /// 
    xtitle("Discrete Change in Predicted Prison Term (in Months) for Blacks") 
fitstat 
